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This was another week quite to the taste of German constitutional phariseeism:
the most direful things keep happening all around, in the UK House of Commons,
in the US House of Representatives, in the Supreme Court in Madrid, spectacles
of democratic and constitutional self-destruction of a dimension we’ve rarely seen
before. Oh, aren’t we glad to have our fine Grundgesetz, some may have sighed
while watching these events from a supposedly safe distance, silently sending praise
to the Lord for the fact that we are not like those people.
Those who indulge in this sort of self-complacency should immediately familiarize
themselves with an article published last Thursday in the FAZ, written by one of
my personal favourites in contemporary German constitutional law, the eminently
sharp and eloquent Christoph Schönberger from Constance. In the Federal Republic
of Germany, according to Schönberger, a "creeping erosion of democracy" is
underway, less visible and less spectacular than Kaczy#ski, Orbán and Trump,
but not altogether incomparable. The German case of democratic decay does not
happen on the open political stage, but is set in motion somewhere far down in the
"machine room of power".
Schönberger counts four instances of recent damage deliberately done to German
democracy: 1) The way the rules of procedure of the Bundestag were manipulated
to keep the office of opening the constituent session from falling to the AfD,
2) the increase of state party financing at the behest of cash-strapped Social
Democrats, basically justified with nothing but "because we can", 3) the half-baked
and hypocritical "reform" of the parliamentary questioning of the government, 4)
and finally the stubborn refusal to reform the electoral law despite the foreseeable
explosion of the number of seats in the Bundestag.
That stuff is, by itself, all tremendously technical and hardly suited to arouse
much passion outside the community of hard-core constitutional law nerds. In
Schönberger’s view, however, it becomes a democracy problem because the
Coalition formerly known as Grand by Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
has been operating the machine levers of power in the aforementioned way: the two
major parties of the old Federal Republic with their long since illusory claim to each
represent half of the political spectrum and thus the whole together. "The parties
of the governing coalition out of pure egoism try to prolong the status quo of the
former Federal Republic into the future. Out of weakness, they damage elementary
foundations of democratic power competition and functioning parliamentarism for the
sake of short-term retention of power."
++++++A Note from FU Berlin+++++
Please note the Call for Papers for a workshop on "European Responses to the
Decay of the Rule of Law and Human Rights Protections in Turkey: Exceptional or
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symptomatic?" organised by Dr. Esra Demir-Gürsel (Post-doctoral Researcher at
Freie Universität Berlin) and Prof. Basak Cali (Hertie School of Governance).
++++++++Paid Advertisement+++++++
I think Schönberger is indeed onto something here. The examples listed by him may
be dismissed as rather petty in comparison to the much more egregious cases of
Poland, Hungary, UK, USA. German democracy will definitely not perish because
the constituent session of Parliament will henceforth be opened by the longest
standing member instead of the eldest. But that is not the point. The point is that
Christian and Social Democrats change the political rules of the game with a simple
majority.
The Christian/Social Democrat government used be called "the Grand Coalition"
because it was formed by parties that normally oppose each other as government
and opposition and, when for a change they decide to join forces, are able to muster
a constitutional supermajority. They don’t anymore, though. Not by a long shot. The
CDU and the SPD nowadays are just two other medium-sized parties among many
other small and medium-sized parties. Their alliance is in no way grander than any
other coalition. They have no more right to change the rules of the game than any
other coalition with a simple majority. And yet they did.
Premium on the legal possession of power
Some rules of the game of political competition are enshrined in the constitution and
can’t be changed but by a two-thirds majority. But by no means all. The nitty-gritty
details of party law, parliamentary law, electoral law, all this is ordinary federal law.
Which can be enacted and amended by a simple parliamentary majority.
As the frightening example of Poland shows, a simple majority under certain
circumstances is all it takes to turn the entire constitutional order upside down.
Kaczy#ski’s PiS party never commanded a constitutional majority, and yet
it managed (with the help of the president) to lay waste to large parts of the
institutional set-up of the Polish constitutional order, with the constitutional court as
its first and most prominent victim. Now, they basically own the rules of the political
game as a Schmittian premium on the legal possession of power and use them,
basically unconstrained, to get rid of whatever law they find constraining their power.
In a functioning democracy, you just don’t do that kind of thing. There is an
understanding that the majority won’t change the rules of the game over the head
of the opposition just because it can. That informal convention is based on the
experience that the majority of today is the minority of tomorrow and vice versa, and
sanctioned by the public that will punish any violation as a political scandal of the
greatest order.
Schönberger’s findings are that these conventions have already started to erode in
Germany. That observation can be explained: In the current legislative period, it is
not so clear any more who is actually the majority and who is the minority, who is
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the government and who is the opposition. The SPD is somehow both, and so are
the Greens (via the second chamber, the Bundesrat). And everyone agrees that
the AfD must be kept out at all cost. The situation is confusing to an extent that two
parties who jointly change the rules of the game at the expense of the others may
just simply get away with it because no-one notices and no-one cares.
Now let’s assume for a minute that one day the AfD will come into the possession
of a parliamentary majority, perhaps in alliance with the Bavarian CSU and the
emerging nationalist "Werteunion" wing of the CDU. They wonder how they could
use that majority to finally finish off the "traitors to the people". It won’t be long
before their lawyers find the answer: In principle, the entire arsenal of ordinary
constitutional law is open to them, from the Federal Constitutional Court Act to the
Parties, Deputies and Federal Election Act. And when someone shows up and
complains that it is undemocratic to change the rules of the game with a simple
majority and over the heads of everyone else – then they will just grin broadly and
say: boohoo! You did the same thing to us, remember? You only whine because it’s
now you who gets hit. All your constitutionalism is merely political. You say: rules of
the game. We say: majority. Watch us.
Hard times
In Poland, if you allow me a bit of constitutional phariseeism, the times are still
way worse than here. TOMASZ KONCEWICZ gives an insight into what the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal, some four years after the beginning of the constitutional
conflict, looks like on the inside today. Not a pretty sight at all.
In the United Kingdom, it looks like the decision on deal or no-deal Brexit will be
postponed until the last moment and at the same time existentially exacerbated.
JACK SIMSON CAIRD’s outlook for the vote in the House of Commons on
Wednesday was outdated by the Prime Minister’s advance the day before in terms of
the course of events, but not in substance.
In Germany, the Federal Fiscal Court has denied the anti-globalist NGO Attac its
tax exemption as a charity. As far as the outcome of the case is concerned, ANNA
LEISNER-EGENSPERGER agrees with the tax judges: Attac, like Icarus, has come
too close to the sun of party politics, and that has melted the wax of their charitable
wings away. In terms of the legal criteria of non-profit status, however, the Court got
it all wrong.
The German Federal Constitutional Court will have to decide on the legislative
compromise on the prohibition of advertising for abortions (§ 219a StGB) after a
norm control motion by the opposition parties. ALEXANDER THIELE is skeptical
about attempts to unravel political compromises by means constitutional law like
these, and about the instrument of the abstract norm control procedure in general.
In Italy, the Constitutional Court has recalibrated its tense relationship with the
European Court of Justice in terms of interpretation and application of fundamental
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rights. ORESTE POLLICINO and GIORGIO REPETTO explain what this decision is
about and what consequences it might bear.
In Germany, the AfD has successfully applied for a temporary injunction against the
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, according to which the Office
may no longer call the right-wing party a "test case" for surveillance for the time
being. KLAUS GÄRDITZ has looked into the reasoning of the Administrative Court of
Cologne and finds it unconvincing.
India and Pakistan are toeing the line of (nuclear?) war right now in the most
alarming manner. At the same time, the hostile countries also argue under
international law, namely before the ICJ about the question of whether the right to
consular access to prisoners also applies if the detainee is a spy. ADEEL HUSSAIN
reports.
Last week’s decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court against the
disenfranchisement of people with disabilities continues to cause controversy. Our
own ANNA VON NOTZ vigorously questions the premise that the act of voting
must be in person and excludes representation. MARTEN BREUER contrasts the
Karlsruhe decision with the position of the UN Disability Rights Committee and asks
who should have the last word between constitutional and international law in this
matter.
Regarding the ongoing debate on gender parity in Parliament in Germany, FRAUKE
BROSIUS-GERSDORF considers a quota to be unavoidable in order to do justice to
the equal opportunity mandate of the Grundgesetz, but recommends to start with the
nomination of candidates for direct election instead of the voting list.
Elsewhere
The Strasbourg Observers Blog announces the results of its annual survey of the
best and worst ECtHR judgements. The worst is the decision Sinkova (fried eggs
over the flame at the grave of the unknown soldier in Ukraine), which I commented
on here.
MARK MANCINI reflects on the spectacular revelations of the former Attorney
General of Canada about the disregard of Prime Minister Trudeau’s people towards
the rule of law.
OLIVIER BEAUD recommends critical reading of the Conseil d’Etat’s latest report
on citizenship against the background of the Yellow West protests in France and
wonders what business the Council of State has to address such a political matter in
the first place.
FRANCESCO MEDICO praises the verdict of the Labour Court of Turin, which
improves the position of precariously employed delivery persons in Italy.
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MARIOLINA ELIANTONIO and SASCHA HARDT consider the member poll of the
Cinque Stelle party on the waiver of the immunity of the Italian Interior Minister
Salvini to be an abuse of direct democracy.
TOMI TUOMINEN describes how the Finnish Constitutional Committee deals with
the Ultra Vires control on the ESM case.
JULIANO ZAIDEN BENVINDO compares the inauguration of Brazilian President
Bolsonaro with that of Donald Trump.
That’s it for this week. All the best!
Max Steinbeis
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